While most contemporary historians agree that the use of debt peonage as a coercive labor contract in Mexico was not widespread, scholars still concur that it was an important and pervasive institution in Yucatan state during the henequen boom of the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. The henequen boom concurred with the long rule of Porfirio Díaz (1876Díaz ( -1910, under whose watch property rights were reallocated through land laws, and Mexico's economy became much more closely tied to the United States. In the Yucatan, the accumulation of debts by peons rose as hacendados sought to attract and bond workers to match the rising U.S. demand for twine. We examine the institutional setting in which debt operated and analyze the specific functions of debt: who got it, what form it took, and why it varied across workers. We stress the formal and informal institutional contexts within which hacendados and workers negotiated contracts.
Introduction
Turner's account of debt peonage in Yucatan -first published in the muckracking journal the American Magazine -made an immediate impact on Americans' perceptions of their southerly neighbors, and became the text to which all future scholars of Yucatan's labor conditions first turn. Turner built a compelling narrative of slavery and oppression on Yucatecan haciendas and argued that these conditions were due to the policies of Mexico's long-time president, Porfirio Díaz, whose overthrow he advocated.
Subsequent scholars have modified Turner's account, carefully detailing the institutional and cultural context of labor conditions on Porfirian henequen haciendas. However, a paucity of data has made it difficult to heavily revise Turner's initial findings, and no one has directly tied the broader setting to the specific timing and function of debts. In this paper, we strike a balance between the critics of debt peonage who see it as pure exploitation and apologists who claim that debt peonage in Yucatan was not as harsh or as widespread as critics suggest. While many scholars have examined debt peonage during this period using qualitative methods, we utilize economic theory and data analysis to examine the existence and persistence of this institution.
Almost all labor contracts have multiple margins in addition to a wage. When monitoring costs loom large, as they always did in pre-mechanized agriculture, employers negotiated contracts that reduced these costs. Agriculture is characterized by high seasonal demands for labor or relative labor scarcity in "boom" times. In response to relative labor scarcity, agricultural producers raise salaries but may also alter other margins of contracts in order to tie laborers to their farms. On henequen haciendas in the Yucatan, the most striking aspect of labor contracts is that workers accumulated large debts "on the books" that hacendados never expected to be repaid.
While large upfront transfers with no chance of repayment may at first glance seem to be an inefficient means of attracting and motivating labor, we argue that within Yucatan's institutional and cultural setting debt served both of these functions.
In this paper, we advance three larger points concerning debt peonage in Yucatan. First, we argue that even though the institutional setting during this period was coercive and designed to favor hacendado interests, workers still made choices and responded to incentives. Had conditions outside the hacienda been less coercive, bargaining power would certainly have shifted in favor of workers, because labor was scarce during the heyday of henequen.
1 Second, the specific form that debt took in the Yucatan was shaped by cultural and social norms. The ruling elite drew on these norms, shared by Maya and non-Maya alike, to increase the demand for debt at a young age, in particular by encouraging increases in the size and expense of marriages. Finally, debt was part of a system of paternalism that compensated workers on multiple margins and increased loyalty to hacendados.
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The henequen boom begins with the invention of the mechanical reaper in the U.S. and the mechanical rasper in the Yucatan. Our study ends when the revolution "came to Yucatan," leading to the cancellation of workers' debts and the establishment of a minimum wage. 3 Our study therefore roughly coincides with the rule of Porfirio Díaz from 1876 to 1910. While the revolution swept the rest of Mexico beginning in 1910, elites in Yucatan held off its arrival until 1915, when General Carranza sent in his 1 See Steinfeld and Engerman (1997) for a discussion of the various meanings of the words "coercion" and "free." 2 Consistent with our view was the absence of perpetual debt for non-Mayan workers. The general mechanism that we have in mind is very similar to the paternalistic agricultural labor contracts used in the U.S. South from the late 19 th century until cotton was mechanized in the 1960s (Alston and Ferrie 1999) . Our argument builds on the work of Wells and Joseph (1996) for their understanding of the institutional setting, Peniche (1998; 1994) for her work on the importance of Maya rituals and debt, and Nickel (1997a; for his research on the use and size of debts. 3 While debt peonage was officially outlawed in Mexico in 1914, Haber, Razo, and Mauer (2003, 335) argue that the revolution had little immediate effect on production levels. The number of debt peons has been estimated at 20,767 in 1880; 80,216 in 1900; and 125,000 in 1910 (Joseph 1986, 55) .
"constitutionalist" troops. The revolution brought to an end the institutional setting within which labor contracting took place during the Porfiriato.
Because of its importance in shaping contracts, we begin Section II with a discussion of the institutional context at the federal level followed by the institutional specifics of the Yucatan region. In Section III we discuss how the ecological characteristics of the Yucatan and the cultivation of henequen in particular influenced the use of labor. Section IV begins with a discussion of the multiple margins of labor compensation on henequen haciendas, including a description of overall labor conditions. We then review the literature on debt peonage followed by our hypotheses concerning debt and contracting which stress the importance of understanding the formal and informal contexts within which contracting transpires. Finally, in Section V we present a case study of a henequen hacienda, Itzincab-Cámara, from which we provide evidence consistent with these arguments.
IIa. Institutional context: federal
After decades of almost constant struggle between conservatives and liberals, Porfirio Díaz came to power in 1876 determined to bring stability to a fractured nation.
While consistently maintaining his opposition to re-election, he served several consecutive terms in office until he was overthrown by revolutionary forces and sent into exile in 1910. 4 During his time in office, Díaz sought to modernize Mexico and brooked little dissent from those who opposed his vision of progress. Díaz sought to unify Mexico's distinct regions to create a strong centralized nation, and he did this by greatly concentrating control in the office of the Presidency.
Díaz measured progress and modernization with metrics such as the miles of railroad tracks laid and the percentage of land dedicated to export crops (e.g., henequen, chicle, sugar, and cotton). On these measures, the country progressed greatly. Much of the capital for Mexico's economic expansion came from foreign investors. U.S. investors, for example, financed the railroad system and, by the end of the Porfiriato, owned some 20% of all Mexican land.
The law of the land during the Porfiriato was the 1857 constitution. Despite violating its provisions when necessary, Díaz did not seek to abrogate it; liberals viewed this Constitution as the quintessential symbol of Mexican nationalism (Guerra, 1988, 29) . Indeed, a bloody civil war had been fought over it and liberals had triumphed. The enumeration of individual rights in this Constitution was, as one prominent Mexican historian put it, "practically exhaustive" (Guerra 1988, 33) . In terms of labor, the Constitution prohibited the rendering of personal service without just compensation and full consent. 5 The 1856 Reform Laws of the previous year had abolished all corporate forms of land ownership; the 1857 Constitution reiterated this prohibition, which was primarily aimed at the Church. The stripping of corporate property rights also greatly facilitated the expropriation of communal lands from indigenous communities, many of which had previously owned lands as pueblos, or villages. According to the Reform Laws, village ejido land was to be divided among heads of families, each receiving a small parcel (Wells and Joseph 1996, 151) . In effect, the 1857 Constitution substituted group rights and privileges with individual rights. Despite its lofty rhetoric, however, average citizens had little recourse to defend themselves when abuses occurred.
Political parties and elections were elite affairs and not expressions of popular will.
During the Porfiriato, official candidates were chosen for all regional and local elections, with the President himself often intervening in elections of national importance (Guerra 1988, 39) . Elections were solemnly observed in strict accordance with the law, serving mainly to legitimize and strengthen the power of the central government as arbitrator of disputes among the political elite. Supreme Court justices were also elected for six-year terms and were similarly indebted to the President for their positions.
If the Díaz administration privileged foreign investors, at the other end of the spectrum were workers and peasants, who protested more openly and with greater frequency after the turn of the century. Díaz did not hesitate in using the army to put down strikers and rebel Indians. In 1901 he sent the army north, brutally suppressing a 
IIb. Institutional Context: Yucatan State
The Díaz years brought more than a measure of political stability to Yucatan, which, like much of the rest of Mexico during the early to mid-nineteenth century, was characterized by frequent changes of government. Between 1848 and 1873, for example, the state had 26 governors, including seven in 1873 (Wells and Joseph 1996, 22) . Díaz installed military governors, set up a political machine, and stabilized the rules of the game by which elites in Yucatan interacted. Succession of power in Yucatan during these years was "without bloodshed or unnecessary emotions," not something that could be taken for granted before 1876 (Reed 1964, 230) .
Political and economic power overlapped, and in Yucatan economic power increasingly became tied to a single export crop: henequen. During the henequen boom the state was described as "one vast cleared plantation" (Reed 1964, 220) . Exports of henequen rose from less than 6 million kilos in 1875 to 43 million in 1885 and to 81 million in 1900. The political power of hacendados increased concomitantly. Perhaps the most blatant example of the relationship between economic and political power was the 1902 election of Olegario Molina as governor of Yucatan. Molina was the owner of the state's largest henequen export house whose power to control production increased when his company signed a pact with International Harvester in 1902. In effect, this "secret" pact guaranteed lower prices for henequen in exchange for being the sole supplier to International Harvester (Joseph 1982, 45) .
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As a result of the "green gold," Yucatan went from being one of the poorest states in the republic to one of the richest. The transformation of the northwestern region of the state into a mono-crop economy happened relatively quickly and was moved along significantly by the Caste War. 8 The early years of the conflict shifted the bulk of the state's population westward toward Merida and away from the rebels in the southeast, making additional laborers available for work on the expanding lands dedicated to henequen production. Additionally, the heaviest fighting and casualties of the war occurred in the sugar-producing region around Valladolid and Tekax, destroying many sugar plantations in its wake (Reed 1964, 147) . 9 Between deaths and displacement, the first decade of the conflict claimed between one-third and one-half of
Yucatan's population of 600,000 (Joseph 1982; Reed 1964, 122; Rugeley 1996, xii) .
From 1750 to 1850, cattle and corn haciendas dominated the rural landscape of Yucatan. As these haciendas expanded, owners used their political power to appropriate communal lands from nearby villages. Some displaced peasants were pushed onto these haciendas when communal lands were broken up; others were pressured through the accumulation of debt. Eiss (2007, 9) notes that by 1841 in the town of Hunucmá, a district on the western edge of the henequen zone, some 24% of the total population resided on haciendas and ranches. However, over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century in the same town of Hunucmá, the percentage of peasants living on haciendas rose to approximately 50%. While cautioning that these estimates may be inflated, Joseph (1982, 55-56) reports an estimate by Frank 7 The pact between International Harvester and Molina and Co. channeled loan capital through the governor's son-in-law Montes and friends (some thirty inter-connected planter families; aka "The Divine Caste") to the planters, securing liens on future fiber production and often mortgages on the plantations themselves, which enabled the trust to dictate the future price at which the producers would be forced to sell to them (Joseph, 1982, 56) . 8 The henequen zone ringed the city of Merida and it was here where we see mono-crop production. Batt (1991, 205) argues that haciendas outside the henequen zone maintained a more diversified productive base. In the eastern region, both henequen and cane were cultivated and processed for regional and international markets while in the south and east of the state, maize, cattle, and yucca were raised for sale and for local consumption. 9 Brannon and Baklanoff (1987, 30) argue that the Caste War "basically destroyed the sugar industry" and seriously reduced cattle grazing. Constitution, the use of debts to tie labor to hacendados was legal in Yucatan.
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The law further restricted worker mobility by granting an exemption from military service to all permanent laborers attached to haciendas. 11 State law obliged all males between the ages of 15 and 60 to serve in the militia (Wells and Joseph 1996, 154) . The easiest and least expensive way that peasants could avoid the leva, which was widely feared and hated, was to attach themselves to a hacienda as full-time, indebted workers (Wells 1985, 160) . Being a peon on a hacienda also exempted peasants from labor drafts for road-building or public works, which, though illegal according to Mexican law, was common-practice in the Yucatan. In short, residing and working on a hacienda may well have been the best choice among otherwise worse alternatives.
While the 1857 Constitution guaranteed male citizens the right to vote and be voted into public office, in practice, poll-taxes and other barriers prevented many individuals, including most Maya peasants, from exercising their rights. Writing about Hunucmá, Eiss argues that local notables and landowners "rotated in power in local government positions, using political office to support the enforcement of forced labor, indebted servitude, and their expropriation of land and labor more generally" (Eiss 2007, 27) . Close ties between local justices of the peace and district-level jefes políticos made it very difficult for poor people to find relief in the court system. Wells and Joseph assert that "in many cases, collaboration was cemented by kinship ties between hacendados and state officials" (Wells and Joseph 1996, 158) .
In sum, liberal land policies, the lack of enforcement of constitutional guarantees, and state laws that obliged Maya to serve as conscripts and work on road gangs without pay generally reduced Maya autonomy. Besides the institutional and cultural forces that kept workers tied to the haciendas, ecological factors also played a crucial role in immobilizing labor.
IIIa. Ecological Context: Yucatan
The Yucatan peninsula consists of a large block of limestone covered by a very thin layer of topsoil, making slash and burn-with a twelve year cycle of land rotationthe standard method of agriculture. There are no lakes or rivers in the henequen zone.
The default vegetation is a low-lying tropical forest. During the Porfiriato, water was pumped from wells using windmills or accessed through cenotes, water-filled sinkholes that dot the landscape. Control of these cenotes lay in the hands of haciendas, whose central houses often were located near or on top of them. Weather also played a crucial role in the life of the hacienda. The high temperatures average above 90 degrees
Fahrenheit from March through September, making travel and work difficult. Droughtssuch as the one from 1903 to 1904 -increased the variance of agricultural output (Hartmann 1966, 193) . Finally, the peninsula is prone to locust plagues. These hit the peninsula from 1881 to 1886 and led to widespread destruction of the maize crops. Gill (1991, 41) notes that the plagues of the 1880s contributed to an increase in the population on haciendas from 21,000 to 26,000 in those years. Locust plagues from 1907 to 1911 increased the bargaining power of henequeneros and led to increased violence between workers and bosses (Wells and Joseph 1996, 174-175) . droughts and locust plagues left peasants with the unfortunate choice of starvation or moving to a hacienda (Eiss 2007, 16; Gill 1991, 43-45; and Wells 1985, 94) .
IIIb. Henequen
The henequen plant is a member of the agave family (Agave fourcroydes), and is well-suited to Yucatan's climate, particularly the relatively drier, rockier northwestern region of the state. Henequen has been grown since pre-Columbian times for the long, tough fibers that can be harvested from its leaves. For centuries, Maya manually harvested, rasped, and treated these fibers to make rope and baskets. Prior to the henequen boom, the most time consuming segment of the production process was the removal of the fibers from the henequen leaf. Cultivation, mostly for domestic use, continued through the Colonial period; any surplus was made into ropes and shipped to Veracruz or Cuba through the Yucatecan port of Sisal (Millet Cámara 2006, 85) . It was not until the invention of mechanical rasper (desfibradora) in the late 1850s that production of the crop became commercially viable. 12 Demand for unskilled labor rose dramatically as production levels increased. Due to the invention of the mechanical rasper, the bottleneck in production switched from rasping to weeding the henequen fields and cutting the leaves, which needed to be done year-round. Daily, a typical worker weeded 1-2 mecates or cut roughly 2000 leaves. 13 These leaves needed to be processed within a couple of days or they became dry and unusable. Therefore the henequen plantation took on some aspects of industrial production, with the machine room and rasping machines at the heart of production.
14 Henequen plants take five to seven years to reach maturity and produce their first harvest. After that, 12 leaves (pencas) are cut four times a year. Since plants mature at differing times, workers are kept busy harvesting almost the entire year.
12 The rasping machine was invented by a Yucatecan, José Esteban Solís, in a competition sponsored by the state government. The mechanical rasper was akin to the cotton gin in terms of decreasing the costs of processing the plant. 13 Roughly 25 mecates are in a hectare. 14 The growing and harvesting of henequen differs from sugar in that henequen can be harvested year round, leading to a constant labor demand. Henequen processing is similar to the processing of sugar in that once harvested both plants need to be processed within a certain period of time to obtain the optimal yields from the plant. See Dye (1998) for a discussion of the contracts that arose in Cuba to reduce holdup in sugar processing.
Harvesting involves six distinct operations: 1) cutting the leaf itself; 2) removing the end spine; 3) shearing off the side spines; 4) gathering the leaves; 5) tying the leaves in bundles of 50; and 6) transporting the bundles to the tramway (Peniche 1994, 77) . In addition to periodic harvesting, over the course of its 25-year life span henequen plants require periodic weeding. Given the long lead time before plants can be harvested, the need for plants to grow between harvests, and the continuous need for firewood to fuel the machinery, henequen production required workers to be dispersed throughout the hacienda, raising monitoring costs.
Compared to haciendas in other regions of Mexico during the Porfiriato, Yucatecan haciendas were small. Many, if not most, were between 1,000 and 2,000 hectares in size (Chardon 1960, 64) . Even Yucatan's most extensive hacienda, San
Gerónimo Yaxcopoil, was about 11,000 hectares, which pales in comparison to the largest haciendas in the north of Mexico. 16 Fox (1961, 221) reports that, in 1916, 1100 haciendas cultivated 790 thousand acres of henequen and 850 rasping mills processed the fiber for export.
IVa. Multiple Margins of Labor Compensation
A range of contractual options was available to managers of henequen haciendas in the Yucatan. 17 According to Cámara Zavala (1936) , four general categories of workers existed in the pre-boom era, but there was substantial mixing and innovation. 18 Renters and sharecroppers lived either on the hacienda or in a nearby pueblo. They paid either a fixed quantity or a share of output to the landowner. Indebted resident workers, or peones, worked and lived on the estate. They were tied to the estate via the debt they owed the hacendado. Luneros were an intermediate class.
They worked one day a week (Monday) for the hacendado, either in compensation for a debt or for housing and water. 19 Finally, wage earners lived in the pueblo and worked on a casual basis for employers.
During the henequen boom, the lunero contract was largely abandoned in the central henequen zone, as the workers operating under this contract became more indebted to the hacienda and became full-time employees. 20 Peons were the permanent, indebted work force of the hacienda. 21 Three other types of workers continued to work on the haciendas. Salaried workers such as foremen and machinists earned a flat weekly or monthly salary. Casual laborers worked intermittently on the documents, contemporary newspaper reports, and hacienda records. The data are generally scattered, and finding a detailed set of information concerning a particular region or a particular hacienda is quite difficult. Several factors have led to the scarcity of data in the Yucatan. First, the climate makes preserving paper records difficult. The papers are often brittle and have been eaten by a variety of vermin. Second, the revolution may have induced many owners to destroy any records of debt peonage. Third, destruction of papers may have been due to space constraints. Kirk (1975, 141) reports that his search for henequenero documents ended with a statement that the documents "had been stored in a warehouse for a time but were finally burned." Finally, those data that still exist are often in private collections and are difficult for researchers to access. 18 Cámara Zavala was a member of the same Cámara family who owned Hacienda Itzincab-Cámara (1898 , which is our principal case study in this paper. 19 The lunero system had its historical roots in the colonial era, when hacendados advanced Maya money so that they could pay their tributes and taxes. In exchange, the Maya would work one day a week on the hacienda (Chardon, 1960, 36) . 20 Indeed, the term lunero became synonymous with a full-time employee. Some vestiges of the old lunero system still existed. On Hacienda Tabi, workers who owed between 100 and 200 pesos worked for a short, specified period of time; workers who owed between 200 and 300 pesos worked every other week; and workers who owed more than 300 pesos were full-time employees (Rejón, 1993, 83; Meyers and Carlson 2002, 229) . This subtlety in the debt structure may have been due to Tabi's location on the periphery of the henequen zone. 21 Peons were recorded in the accounting books of the hacienda in several ways. First, they were in the cuentas corrientes, the running account books of the hacienda. These books listed the reason for incurring debt, its amount, and the date of the loan. The nómina was a list of employees that included titles and job descriptions. The semanarios, or the weekly work ledger, generally listed the name, the daily activity and output of the worker, the daily wage, and the weekly wage. Some also listed the rations given to the workers. A carta cuenta was recorded if a worker's debt was bought from or sold to another hacienda. Finally, workers could be listed in the probate records of a hacendado. Their debts were listed either individually or more commonly as a group.
hacienda for a piece rate wage during periods of high labor demand. Less commonly, debt-free sharecroppers continued to exist in some areas (Meyers and Carlson 2002, 230, fn 5) . Haciendas drew their labor from a variety of sources: local, national, and international. The most obvious labor source was the local pueblo. The Maya were tied historically to their ancestral lands and had a preference for staying in the region (Baerlein 1914, 155) . This preference shaped the margins of the contracts that hacendados used with their Mayan workers. Despite a preference by "locals" for staying in the area, during the boom times of henequen Maya laborers also were imported from other regions of the Yucatan, for instance from regions hit by locust plagues or droughts. Laborers were drawn from other regions of Mexico, most notably from the north -the Yaquis -and from the central highlands -generically known as
Mexicanos. 22 Finally, experiments in drawing workers from abroad included Koreans, Cubans, Chinese, and Italians.
The exact terms of the labor contracts between peons and hacendados varied widely and are difficult to generalize. Travelers' accounts generally agree that the workday began early in the morning, probably around 3 a.m. Turner (1910, 20) reports that peons worked from 3:45 until dark and required the help of family members to fulfill their daily tasks. Baerlein (1914, 155) reports that hacendados transformed the traditional communal labor, the fajina, into several "unpaid" hours of work per day. Batt (1991) reports that in the eastern Espita region, the fajina lasted for 4-5 hours and the workday ended at 7 p.m. Narváez (1992), however, reports from a personal interview with an ex-peon that the workday started at 3 a.m. and ended at noon for the majority of the workers. Only those workers assigned to rasping or drying worked through the afternoon. Hartmann (1966, (115) (116) generalizes that the workday commenced at 4 a.m., began with 20 minutes to two hours worth of fajina, and generally ended at 2 to 3 p.m.
While it is clear that working conditions were harsh during the boom, the lack of clear evidence on the structure of the workday and the duties of the workers makes 22 Since the Yaquis were sent to Yucatan as prisoners or war, working conditions were very harsh for them (see Wells and Joseph 1996, 164, 206) .
quantifying the degree of harshness difficult. For instance, while semanarios indicate that workers during the boom typically cut between 1,000 and 2,500 leaves per day or cleared between one and two mecate of land, Chardon (1960, 104) reports that workers on haciendas and ejidos in 1950 harvested between 2,000 and 2,500 leaves per day or weeded between three and four mecate of land, more if they were assisted by their sons. The lower level of measured productivity in the earlier period is most likely due to the other "unpaid" duties that workers needed to perform during the course of the day.
Hartman (1966, (123) (124) , who describes the labor conditions as "benevolent serfdom,"
states that "the average daily task was three thousand leaves, an effort that could be performed without strain in six to eight hours."
The record of the role of women and children on the hacienda also varies. In her work on sugar haciendas in eastern Espita, Batt (1991) reports that older and younger male workers had shorter workdays. According to reports by ex-peons on Hacienda
Tabi, another (mostly) sugar hacienda in southern Yucatan, children worked from a very young age, helping their parents. These reports indicate that the daily pay was only half of what a peon earned. Several accounts note that women's and children's work was considered to be supplemental to that of the men (Peniche 1994; Rejón 1993; Gill 1991) . Accounts vary as to whether women were paid for their labor. For example, Peniche argues that when temporary workers were needed to cut leaves in the harvesting process, married cutters often employed their wives and children. Women never went to work in the fields alone, but rather accompanied their husbands. In her case study of Hacienda Tabi, Rejón (1993, 75) notes that the male workers during the June sugar harvest were so busy that the women and the children helped in the planting, hoeing, and harvesting of corn and other indigenous crops. According to Don
Nicolás Villarreal, an ex-peón on Hacienda Tabi, women's work in the campo (countryside) consisted of caring for the pigs and small birds and planting and harvesting chiles and tomatoes. On Hacienda Tabi Don Nicolás reported eight hectares of vegetables cultivated with female labor, for which the women were paid a salary of 50-70 centavos per day. Finally, Peniche (1994) and Gill (1991) both note that within Maya families, women's labor was considered part of the unpaid informal household economy and that the hacienda system exploited this practice. In addition to these unpaid agricultural chores, women performed unpaid domestic services in the houses of the hacendados.
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Compensation for work occurred on multiple margins. Peons were paid for their weekly work either in cash or in fichas, hacienda-issued coins. 24 Some haciendas gave a ration of corn to each worker. Haciendas provided some food and water during the workday. Tying themselves to a hacienda also gave many workers milpa, a plot of land used for subsistence agriculture. 25 The milpa was very important to the Maya since many lost their property rights to land after the liberalization of land laws in 1856.
Haciendas offered resident peons housing, medical care, and in some cases education for the young. The tienda de raya (company store) sold staples such as corn and
clothing. There is mixed evidence as to whether prices at the tiendas de raya were much higher than prevailing elsewhere (Arnold and Frost 1909, 325; Turner 1910, 18; and Joseph 1986, 68) or if prices were actually subsidized during certain periods in order to maintain social stability on the hacienda (Gill 1991, 142; and Peniche 1994, 84) . As noted earlier, classification as a resident of a hacienda exempted workers from conscription, either into the army or into road corvées. Finally, owners provided loans to workers for a variety of purposes.
IVb. Debt Peonage in Perspective
The exact contractual role that debt played during the henequen boom is often described in the literature in vague terms. Travelers' accounts generally note that debt 23 The Mayan custom of women not working independently gave hacendados an advantage in using debt because it would not have been considered proper for spouses to work off the debt of their husbands. 24 See Leslie and Pradeau (1972) for a description and illustrations of these coins from a large sample of haciendas. 25 Baerlein (1914, 166) reports that the continued granting of milpa in the late boom era was more common in areas further from Merida, but had nearly disappeared in the henequen zone by the time of his writing. Describing the importance of the milpa, he reports that, "In his gun and in his milpa lies the Indian's happiness." Consistent with Baerlein's observations, Wells and Joseph (1999, 163) argue that workers on haciendas in the henequen zone lost their right to milpa over time, and Batt (1991) argues that in Espita, an outlying region, access to milpa continued to be an important form of compensation. Hacienda Tabi, also on the periphery, continued to supply milpa (Rejón 1993). The continued granting of milpa on the periphery may have been due either to the greater bargaining power of the workers or the lower opportunity cost of leaving land in non-henequen production. Contradicting this view of declining milpa in the henequen zone, Gill (2001, 342-354) argues that sufficient land was available for milpa on most haciendas, even in the central henequen zone.
existed and that laborers became enslaved once in debt. Weyl (1902, 43) provides one of the earlier and clearer descriptions of the debt mechanism:
Upon reaching early manhood, at 18 or 20, the young Yucatecan, in order to be enabled to marry, borrows from $100 to $200 from his patron. It is not expected that he will ever repay this debt, and no effort is made either to repay or reduce it. On the contrary, it is usually increased from time to time through occasional misfortunes which befall the peon or his family, or through additional advances made by the planter. The amount of debt thus represents the cost of emancipation, which is not desired or attempted, especially as it may represent the gross wages of several years. … Arnold and Frost (1909) viewed hacendados as essentially motivated by economic interests: "As a rule it may be said that the Yucatecan is a benevolent master.
It pays him to be so, and every Yucatecan's one rule in life is to do what pays him.
Indeed there is really no reason for him to be harsh. The average Indian is as submissive as a well-whipped hound, creeping up after a thrashing to kiss his master's hand" (1909, 333) . They highlight the use of debt to tie workers to the hacienda, and claim that the books of the hacendados were cooked to inflate the debt if the worker tried to leave. the critics to highlight the complete subjugation of the workforce and the apologists as evidence of the consensual nature of employment. Wells and Joseph (1996) strongly critique this narrative of docility, highlighting instead the agency on the part of workers and their ability to resist the hacendados in myriad ways. They argue that three forces led workers to choose to stay on the haciendas. First, both legal and ecological factors served to isolate the hacienda from the outside world. Second, hacendados used coercion in the form of debt peonage and corporal punishment to control the workers. Finally, hacendados offered security in the form of a steady supply of food and a "tepid brand of paternalism." Nickel (1996) Peniche (1994, (82) (83) argues that acquiring debt was a way for workers both to meet their physical needs as well as to fulfill social obligations. Physical needs included medical care or large purchases from the tienda de raya, while social obligations included baptisms, marriages, and fiestas. These large debts were recorded in the accounting books of the hacienda. According to Peniche, the nohoch cuenta was not repayable.
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Peniche argues that hacienda owners saw the nohoch cuenta as a way of maintaining a stable work force while also establishing relative peace on their haciendas by providing funding for social functions that the workers valued highly. 28 In the exchange for debt, hacendados and peons engaged in a kind of reciprocal relationship.
The servants viewed the loans as part of the hacendado's responsibilities -workers offered labor and hacendados offered loans (Peniche 1999 and 1994, 84) . Peniche argues that this social pact was based on a shared sense of social obligations between hacendados and their servants, which was rooted in the Catholic Church and its 27 There is some evidence that the large debts were paid off. Peniche (1993) finds that of the 102 peones on the haciendas of José Maria Peon, 19 paid off their debts and 15 transferred to another hacienda not owned by Peon, most likely after the debt was paid by the new hacendado. 28 Peniche argues that within the henequen zone, the hacendado solidified his own central role in the Maya community by adopting the role of the casamentero (marriage maker), and supplying the mu'huul (bridewealth), thereby usurping the role of the groom's family.
religious celebrations and sacraments. 29 Peniche also notes that non-Maya workers, those from outside Yucatan who came to work on the henequen haciendas, did not incur large debts to pay for religious ceremonies. According to Peniche, loans were not offered to these workers because public religious ceremonies meant less to them, and because hacendados believed that non-Maya would not honor their debts (personal communication).
IVc. Coercion, Culture, and Contracting
As noted in the introduction, we make three points concerning debt peonage in
Yucatan. These relate to the choices made in a coercive institutional environment, the importance of culture in shaping preferences, and the use of paternalism as the contractual choice to attract, motivate and retain labor. The choice to become a peón acasillado was made within an institutional context that gave Maya peasants very little power. Their communal lands had been restricted, their rights to vote were limited, and their recourse to the court system was minimal. As was noted previously, a list of ecological factors can be added to the institutional ones. The climate was a hard one in which to travel, water was restricted to wells or cenotes, and plague or drought often reduced agricultural output. Given the risks, being tied to a hacienda was often the best of a set of bad choices. In this section, we first describe the options available to Maya workers and then analyze the timing and function of debt.
Broadly speaking, once tied to a hacienda through debt, Maya peasants had three paths they could take, depending on their tolerance for their living conditions. First, they could accept their circumstances and continue to work on the hacienda within the general framework created by the hacendado. Second, they could stay on the 29 Since the time of the Conquest, native customs and practices evolved, forming a syncretic blend of Hispanic (Spanish) and native Maya "traditions." Farriss (1984, 90-95; ch. 10) suggests that Maya beliefs and practices occupied a private, clandestine sphere while Christian rites were professed and practiced publicly. Catholicism has also provided a cohesive set of social and cultural norms for both Maya and non-Maya Yucatecos. While Catholic rituals have never completely replaced Maya customs and religious beliefs, local devotion to Catholic saints and icons form the backbone of pueblo religiosity. Bracamonte y Sosa (1994, 106) notes that on henequen haciendas in the nineteenth century "each plantation erected a chapel dedicated to the patron saint to which the Maya rendered devotion; at the same time, Maya recreated many aspects of Maya Christianity [on the plantations]."
hacienda, but attempt to resist the hacendado's power using explicit forms of resistance and what Scott (1985) famously has dubbed the "weapons of the weak." Third, they could attempt to exit the hacienda, either by fleeing or by demanding their carta cuenta and seeking another hacendado to purchase their debt.
A great deal of variability has been documented in the management styles of haciendas. Given their position as the de facto government, hacendados and their administrators had tremendous leeway in how they treated their workers. While some were more liberal in their policies, some administrators were very cruel, leading to workers being beaten arbitrarily and occasionally beaten to death. Oral histories, eyewitness accounts, newspaper reports, and a rich judicial record all provide consistent evidence on the use of physical coercion (see Eiss 2007; Wells and Joseph 1996, 156-60) . While the court records provide evidence of particularly cruel or sensational violence, other sources of evidence indicate that beatings were administered mainly for drunkenness, theft, adultery, or failure to meet a specified level of productivity. Beatings for these purposes seem to have been tolerated by the Maya, or at least did not lead to widespread social unrest. When José Cruz Tun, who was born in 1886 and lived on a sugar hacienda on the fringe of the henequen zone, was asked whether he was ever beaten, he responded: "Never, because my family and I always followed the rules, we never fought" (Rejón 1993, 92-93) . In another oral history, Nicolás Dzul reports beatings for unexcused absences from work, drunkenness, stealing, and adultery. His main recollections though were the beatings for drunkenness (Narváez 1992). Wells and Joseph (1996) report many instances of peasant uprisings against hacienda authority, both from within the hacienda and from the neighboring pueblos.
Documented cases of protest include peasant demonstrations against wage cuts, arson, and rustling. On Hacienda Catmís, whose administration had a reputation for being "notoriously brutal," the "peons destroyed machinery and carved up the hacendado and members of his family and staff" (Wells and Joseph 1996, 175) .
Henequen is a long lived asset, with a lifespan of about 25 years so hacendados had reason to fear sabotage if they mistreated their workers. Gill (1991, 66 and 74) reports the destruction by arson of Hacienda Chablé's henequen fields in 1890 and of Hacienda Sinkehuel's dyewood stands in 1892. With long-lived assets of these sorts, peasant unrest had a valuable target. Indeed, the Merida paper La Revista, in an 1890 defense of the hacienda system, argued that it "made very little sense to mistreat men upon whom the harvesting of very expensive crops depended" (quoted in Hartman 1966, 121) . These documented cases of peasant protest were most likely only the tip of the iceberg of informal peasant bargaining power, which included work slowdowns, feigned illness, petty theft, and carelessness with machinery.
The final path down which indebted peasants could travel was exit. On some haciendas, evidence exists of the sale and purchase of peasants' debt through the carta cuenta. Legally, any peon could approach the hacendado and demand his carta cuenta.
This carta cuenta could then be taken to another hacienda. If the new hacendado wanted the worker, he could pay off the original debt. The ability to find another hacendado to purchase the carta cuenta was greater in the central henequen zone where haciendas were closely located. Workers could also flee. This option seemed to be more viable earlier during the henequen boom and on the eastern and southern periphery of the henequen zone, where indebted workers had a greater ability to flee to the forests controlled by rebel Maya. By the latter part of the henequen boom, transportation (railroad) and communication (telegraph) had improved the ability of authorities to apprehend fugitives (Gill 1991) .
Labor relations on a hacienda fell between two endpoints on a spectrum. The first, and relatively more humane, was one in which market based incentives continued to be used as the primary means of motivating workers, with beatings used for punishment of hacendado-defined "crimes" or unacceptable work effort. The other is one in which hacendado violence and worker protest fed on one another and led to working conditions spiraling down to a highly oppressive state. Evidence of the former type are found in the existing records of the haciendas, the accounts by "apologists" and the general lack of mention of a hacienda in the court records, while evidence of the latter are found in the eyewitness reports, opposition newspapers, and the court records.
Offering a package of paternalism to workers may have been more cost effective than either using violence or raising the salary margin of the contract to increase work effort. We argue that loans were part of this package and served three purposes. First, they were bonuses, usually in the form of a household item or small luxury, for high job performance. Second, they served an insurance function, helping the workers through tough stretches, particularly episodes of illness. Finally, when given for marriages, they
were an important part of the social fabric of a hacienda, elevating the social status of the hacendado among the Maya workers. In all three cases, the hacendado gave a gift to the worker, a gift that required reciprocity in the form of loyalty. An alternative would have been to raise salaries, but doing so most likely would have been more expensive and would not have raised the hacendado's status as the benevolent patron.
Loans for events such as weddings and community fiestas tied locals more closely to other workers on the hacienda and to the hacendado. It is not surprising that most loans were targeted at settling the worker on the hacienda. During our time period, both the hacendados and the church encouraged large weddings. Within Maya communities, hosting wedding ceremonies in which the entire community was invited was a fundamental element of social cohesion. While the Christian forms of these ritualized celebrations (baptisms, weddings, funerals) were introduced by the Catholic Church during the colonial period, the rituals performed on the haciendas were a hybrid of both traditions. The social capital generated from hosting a wedding was location specific to the community in which it was held. Investing in a wedding was a signal of a commitment to the community and the entry of the couple into adulthood. Having a strong social network established bonds and generated greater levels of trust within the community. Being a community insider lowered transaction costs and allowed for risk sharing with other members of the network. Most importantly from a contractual standpoint, it gave ample bargaining power to the hacendado, the central contractual agent on the hacienda. Loans were part of a larger set of paternalistic goods offered by hacendados to workers, including land for milpa, corn rations when prices were high, access to water, medical care, and, on some haciendas, schooling for children. Paternalism reduced risk for both parties. For hacendados, offering paternalism helped ensure a steady yearround labor force, not a small concern in conditions of labor scarcity and high demand.
Paternalism protected workers from the vagaries of agricultural life, periodic locust plagues, military and corvée service, and other unforeseen catastrophes. Workers, however, had to weigh these benefits against the costs of living on a hacienda: loss of autonomy, backbreaking year-round labor, separation from traditional pueblo life centered on the milpa, and the uncertainty of hacendado benevolence. These costs made it necessary for hacendados to offer incentives to attract, motivate, and retain workers, even while the institutional context was tilted heavily in their favor.
The way debt functioned on henequen haciendas in Yucatan bears two similarities to the paternalistic agricultural labor system used in the postbellum U.S.
South prior to the mechanization of cotton. In the U.S. South, landlords and workers implicitly exchanged goods in kind for loyal labor services (Alston and Ferrie, 1999) . The in-kind goods valued most by workers in the South were those that could not be purchased in the market, for example, protection from civil rights abuses. Marriages on henequen haciendas in Yucatan were similar in that the workers did not have sufficient funds to pay for a lavish wedding. This debt tied workers to a hacienda and was a preferred outcome for many Maya given the importance of these events in Mayan culture and the lack of outside options. 31 The following section expands on this discussion of the use of debt by focusing on a single hacienda for which we have detailed records.
Roo, where the groom "lives and works with the bride's family" for a number of years after marriage (Júarez 2001:133 ) . 31 Not all workers were equally dependent on hacendados to provide funds for ritual ceremonies and larger purchases. Narváez (1992) provides testimonies from ex-peons who say that they (or people they knew) paid for their own weddings from funds they had saved, thus not going into debt.
V. Case Study: Hacienda Itzincab-Cámara
Itzincab-Cámara is located in the municipality of Tecoh, roughly 35 kilometers from Merida and was purchased in 1898 by Camilo G. Cámara for the commercial production of henequen. 32 Cámara was a businessman who came from a family of henequen hacendados; in 1890 Cámara had been elected Manager-Director of Yucatan's Union of Henequen Hacendados (based in Merida). While Itzincab-Cámara served as a place of rest and relaxation for the Cámara family, its principal purpose was commercial. At its height, hacienda lands encompassed 3,903 hectares, of which 1,300
were dedicated to henequen.
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Records from the early 20 th century indicate that the hacienda had a standard organizational hierarchy. Among the salaried workers, the first and highest ranking is the mayordomo, or administrator, who represented the owner in his absence. (This was not as much of an issue at Itzincab-Cámara as the owners kept a close watch on the place.) The central function of the mayordomo was to manage the work force, to maintain strict control of the accounts and production, and to procure and administer all the material resources of the hacienda. Under the mayordomo was the personero, in charge of human resources on the hacienda, followed by the maquinista, who was in charge of all matters related to the operation of the rasping machine. Two additional mayordomos, of campo (agriculture) and of rasping, appeared on the list and were responsible for all workers in their area. The hacienda also hired a teacher, listed as la profesora in some years and el professor de musica in others. The semanarios listed 32 Data concerning this hacienda come from a host of civil and parish records dating from 1880 to 1920, the debt book from 1906 to 1912, weekly activity reports from select years from 1897 to 1914, entries from the hacienda's store from 1908 and 1910, and records of payments to outside workers from 1908 and 1913.The Church of the Latter Day Saints (LDS) provided access to the civil and parish records. All citations to these data refer to LDS microfilm reel numbers. All information from the debt book is taken from Nickel (1997a and 1997b) . All remaining records are from the hacienda's archive, housed at CIESAS-Peninsular (Merida). Much of the descriptive information from this section is drawn from Paredes (1997). 33 According to Paredes (1997) , the ownership of Itzincab-Cámara stayed in the Cámara family until 1996, when it was sold to a group of private investors (Grupo Plan). However, even by the 1930s, the lands owned by the family had been drastically reduced, owing mostly to the agrarian reform policies of post-revolutionary governments. In 1934 the hacienda was reduced to 211 hectares, to 14 hectares by 1981 and to four by 1996.
the salaries (but not the names) of the hacienda's administrators. The personero made about 25 pesos, while the mayordomos, blacksmith and teacher made about half that.
The semanarios break down the other workers on the hacienda into several categories. The largest group was the luneros. By this time, the term luneros was used to refer to the full-time, indebted employees of the hacienda. 34 Muchachos, younger sons of the luneros, did about half the work that their fathers did (Paredes 1997, 7).
While workers were not assigned to subcategories in 1905, by 1912, other groups listed on the semanarios were the Maquinistas, who worked the rasping machine,
Aprensadores, who worked the press, Plataformeros, who worked the rail system, Diversos, who mostly worked in the orchard, Mayocols, who were Maya bosses, and masons, carpenters and cowboys. These additional categories seem to indicate additional levels of specialization on the hacienda over time.
From the beginning of its operation as a henequen hacienda, Itzincab-Cámara Koreans reported as being on the hacienda. Later in that same year the number diminished to 13 while the rest were reported as fugitives. The evidence of non-Maya being more likely to flee is consistent with our argument that it was much easier to tie local Maya to the hacienda than outsiders.
34 Based on work of Cámara Závala (1936) , Paredes states that the luneros worked one day a week for the patron and performed free labor, or fajina, each Sunday; however, hacienda semanarios indicate this interpretation of the term luneros was no longer applicable at this time. 35 The Koreans came in 1905 under a four-year contract. The second attempt at contracting with them failed. Notwithstanding the notable presence of foreigners working on the hacienda, Paredes argues that whenever the owners could, they substituted Maya for immigrants. For example, commissions were offered for native Maya from the nearby village of Timucuy, among others. Up to 1919, 66 immigrants continued to work in diverse jobs on the hacienda (Paredes 1997, 8 The debt book records ten workers whose cartas cuentas were purchased by the hacienda between 1908 and 1910. The available information indicates that they began with an average debt of about 197 pesos -considerably more than the average workerand took on approximately 22 pesos more debt by 1912. Based on the date of the entry, the last names of the workers, and the size of the initial debt, we would estimate that the debts of at least another four workers were purchased in order to bring them to the hacienda. This estimate would bring the total number of transferred workers to over 10% of the hacienda's adult workforce. If our estimate of the total number of transfer workers is correct, then a total of seven transfer workers were still on the hacienda in 1914, four of whom were performing higher paying jobs: a carpenter, and press and rail operators. These workers were brought to the hacienda after the largely unsuccessful experiments with the Yaquis and Koreans. They may have been more skilled workers, or the market for new workers may have been so thin that the hacendado was forced to pay top price to recruit new local labor.
No effort to record interest on the debt was made, indicating that the hacendado, at least explicitly, was not attempting to keep workers tied to the hacienda through high interest payments. If debt were solely a binding mechanism, one would expect a high interest rate to be used to inflate the debt. A typical worker who added significant debt was Secundino May, whose debt record is provided in Table 1 . From the civil records of births and parish records of baptisms, we know that he was born on the hacienda on he takes out more debt to purchase furniture. This pattern of working on the haciendain May's case as a muchacho with low debt -followed by a large issuance of debt for a marriage seems to signal a commitment on both the part of the worker and the hacendado to a continuing employment relationship after an initial period on the hacienda. The debts can be seen as a gift, not just to the recipient, but also to the families of the bride and groom and, to a lesser extent, to everyone who attended the marriage ceremony and celebration. On the hacienda, the gifts from the hacendado to the group included marriage celebrations, leniency towards workers, or greater autonomy. The debts may have had a long-run impact on the morale of workers by engendering a reciprocal sense of loyalty on the part of workers. This is especially important given the frequency of workers laboring without supervision. We stress that, given the social relations of the time, debt was useful in tying workers to the hacienda both prior to incurring the debt as well as after the debt was given. Prior to incurring the debt, workers would strive to show loyalty so as to be allowed to borrow and after incurring the debts workers would remain loyal out of gratitude or a sense of obligation. 48 Other prominent family names in 1914 were Chim (16), Chan (13), and Ceh (6).
Aggregating the debt records of hacienda Itzincab-Cámara shows that loans were mostly given for location-specific cultural events, particularly weddings. 49 The timing of large debts for a wedding had the advantage for hacendados of tying workers to a hacienda at time when males were approaching the peak of their labor productivity. Table 2 shows the breakdown in debt by type for those entries from the debt ledger for which we have information, not including the purchase of the cartas cuentas. While fiftyfive percent of the debt was granted directly for weddings, some entries listed as "cash"
were often recorded around the time of a wedding, and could be counted in that category. 50 The category with the highest number of entries was for general supplies, such as clothing, furniture, hoes, and grinding stones. Some of the larger entries in this category were for furniture and were recorded following a wedding. Therefore the costs of marrying and establishing a household could have easily accounted for over 70% of the debt issued to continuing residents. "Bonus" gifts were largely in kind, such as gifts of clothing, furniture, grinding stones, or hoes. Finally, loans that covered emergencies, such as funerals and medical expenses, were important forms of insurance for Maya workers. The hacendado paid for items such as the civil and religious fees, gifts to the bride's family such as "clothes, rings, and a long necklace," and money to cover the wedding fiesta and gifts" (Peniche 1994, 85) . Peniche (1994) estimates these outlays to be 25 pesos for the civil ceremony and celebration, 17 pesos for the religious ceremony, and at least 8 pesos for the bridewealth. 50 These entries listed as cash could have actually have been for credit at the tienda de raya, further tying the worker to the hacienda. 51 Several entries included charges for Gastos de su aprención, or "expenses for his apprehension." These seem to be for the capture of fugitive workers. 52 One explanation for higher wedding debts is that higher productivity workers received greater debts (or gifts) from the hacendado at the time of his wedding. Higher productivity workers may also have been assigned to more remunerative jobs, such as plataformeros. By granting more loans, the hacendado was able to keep higher productivity workers on the hacienda while at 52 The lag between the time of the first entry into the debt book and the time of marriage grew shorter over time. For those entering the debt books before June 1907, the average lag was almost 3 years. For those entering the books after June 1907, the marriage loan was the first entry in the debt book.
the same time solidifying the social status of these workers by financing an elaborate wedding. Debt and salary are therefore complementary mechanisms.
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Of the 28 males whose marriage records we have located in the municipal records for the years 1895 to 1912, 21 were still working on the hacienda in 1914. All of these remaining workers incurred debt, indicating a strong link between debt and continuing employment. All workers employed in 1914 whose marriages are listed in the municipal archives incurred debt. Only three male Maya were married on the hacienda, did not receive a loan for their marriage, and did not work on the hacienda in 1914.
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Given the strong demonstrated relationship between employment and debt, it is likely that either these three workers planned on leaving the hacienda, or the hacendado did not want to commit to these workers by offering them marriage loans.
To explain the variation in the size of debts, we argue that debt was a cheaper margin to adjust than salary. Table 3 provides summary statistics on salary and debt in 1914 by class of worker. 55 Forty of the fifty workers listed as luneros performed the same jobs throughout the course of the week and earned the identical salary (5.12 or 5.13 pesos for the week). On Monday through Wednesday they gathered firewood; on Thursday and Friday they spun rope; and on Saturday they gathered 2500 henequen leaves. Only those workers who were sick or had a different job description (e.g.
plataformero, maquina, huerto) earned a different salary. Indeed, all workers on this hacienda were essentially salaried, with the job description determining the salary for the day. Only in rare cases did two workers assigned to the same job for the day earn different wages. If we exclude the old (diversos) and the young (muchachos), there were only two major job categories, skilled and unskilled, yet within these categories debt varied more than salary. We can visually see the relationship between age and salary in Figure 1 , which is stepwise, from the young to full adults -with differences in salary for luneros and skilled -to the old. 56 Consistent with our observation of "debt clearing the market" we see in Figure 2 much more variation in debt in relation to age.
Higher levels of recorded debt are due to workers having more lavish weddings, getting more bonus gifts in kind over the course of the years, or having more unexpected medical expenses. Note: Number of observations in parentheses. The category "skilled" is made up of all workers not assigned to one of the other categories. Generalizing too much from our research on hacienda Itzincab-Cámara may be a mistake given the wide variety of reported practices on henequen haciendas. But our findings suggest patterns of salary and debt on this hacienda that were responsive in part to market forces. Salary generally tracked the marginal productivity of workers:
older and younger workers, who were generally less productive, earned lower salaries.
But most adult workers earned a salary within a very narrow range. Keeping salary relatively constant and allowing debt to clear the market helped the hacendado cast himself in the role of benevolent patron and engendered loyalty and high work effort in reciprocity. Rather than indicating, as Turner (1910, 12) suggests, that, "The amount of the debt does not matter, so long as it is debt," our evidence suggests that the timing and reasons for debt were carefully considered and played important roles in motivating and retaining the workforce.
Conclusion
The eyewitness reports and a great deal of the historiography on Yucatecan henequen haciendas suggest that debt served mainly to coercively bind workers to the haciendas and hacendados. While debt was certainly used as one of several powerful mechanisms to keep workers on the haciendas, our case study indicates that debt was granted in a systematic manner, consistent with a paternalistic system of labor relations.
Debt was used to bind workers to a hacienda at a young age, to reward more productive workers for their past efforts, and to cover unforeseen expenses. These three functions of debt served to attract, motivate, and ensure the continued loyalty of Maya peons. When considering the logic of any contractual choice, that choice needs to be set within its cultural and institutional context. Our findings suggest that cultural norms -such as the value of having large, elaborate wedding ceremonies -and the coercive institutional setting-such as land ownership and voting laws--were necessary conditions for the granting of an early non-repayable debt.
